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ABSTRACT  
 
This article will consider the progress made towards achieving equality between same and 
different-sex couples seeking formalisation of their relationships by examining the extent to 
which the introduction of civil partnerships and same-sex marriage in England and Wales 
created equality of access to formal relationship statuses, and the benefits thereby accruing. 
Elimination of discrimination between same and different-sex couples in this context was not 
achieved, as accepted by the Court of Appeal in Steinfeld and Keidan, which concerned a 
claim for a civil partnership under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR by a different-sex couple. The 
article will argue that nevertheless furtherance of equality, rather than dignity-based 
arguments, provided the driving force for change and that the next step taken towards 
equality requires the creation of symmetry of access to formalisation of relationships as 
between same and different-sex couples. The Supreme Court in Steinfeld now has the 
opportunity of prompting the taking of that step, but this article further argues that 
recognition of the value of dignity in this context as linked to non-discrimination should 
shape the response of the government, either to that decision, or to its own ongoing review of 
the future of civil partnerships.  
 
Key words: civil partnerships, marriage, Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, Human Rights Act 
 
INTRODUCTION  
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This article interrogates the formal recognition and protection of adult intimate relationships 
in England and Wales1 in order to examine the progress made towards achieving equality 
between same and different-sex couples. It therefore considers in Part 1 the extent to which 
the introduction of civil partnerships and same-sex marriage in England and Wales created 
equality of access to formal relationship statuses, and to the benefits thereby accruing, as 
between same and different-sex couples. It considers the rationales for introducing civil 
partnerships, and then same-sex marriage in England and Wales, focussing on the extent to 
which furtherance of equality appeared to provide the driving force for change, first as a 
political aspiration, but after the advent of the Human Rights Act (HRA), as a more legalised 
concept. It will consider the movement towards equality since then, and some of the 
anomalies created by the asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses flowing from 
the current legal recognition of the marriage and civil partnership statuses in England and 
Wales. It questions the true acceptance of equality as the value underpinning their 
introduction, leading to the finding, despite Parliamentary pronouncements to the contrary, 
that equality was not fully achieved, although a significant step towards creating equality has 
been taken since then, by the Supreme Court in Walker v Innospec Limited and others.2  
 
It argues in Part 2 that the failure to achieve equality was strikingly the case in respect of the 
failure to provide equal access to formalised statuses, as accepted by the Court of Appeal in 
the very significant decision in Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education, 
concerning a claim for a civil partnership by a different-sex couple3 under Articles 8 and 14 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). That decision demonstrated that the value 
of creating equal access for same or different-sex couples to relationship statuses4 has still not 
gained full recognition domestically.5 Such access arises at present in England and Wales 
only asymmetrically since same-sex couples can access civil partnerships or marriage, while 
                                                 
* The authors would like to thank Chris Barton, Roger Masterman, Gillian Douglas and the anonymous 
reviewers for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. All opinions and errors remain our own.  
1  See the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. It should be noted that Scotland introduced same-sex 
marriage in 2014 but Northern Ireland does not currently perform or legally recognise same-sex marriages 
despite discussion of several reform proposals in the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
2 [2017] UKSC 47, [2017] 4 All ER 1004. 
3 [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237. See C Draghici, ‘Equal marriage, unequal civil partnership: a 
bizarre case of discrimination in Europe’ [2017] 29(4) CFLQ 313. 
4 This article assumes that such equal access applies potentially where a partnership has fallen within the 
category which democratic states generally deem worthy of formal recognition of the relationship (for example, 
they may choose to exclude siblings, friends or polygamous relationships): see L Glennon, ‘Displacing the 
‘Conjugal Family’ in Legal Policy: A Progressive Move?’ [2005] CFLQ 141 and N Barker, ‘Sex and Civil 
Partnership Act: The Future of (Non)Conjugality’ [2006] 14 Fem LS 241. 
5 See A Hayward, ‘Registered Partnerships in England and Wales’ in JM Scherpe and A Hayward, The Future 
of Registered Partnerships – Family Recognition beyond Marriage? (Intersentia, 2017).  
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different-sex ones can only access marriage.6 The article proceeds to argue that the Supreme 
Court now has the opportunity in Steinfeld to prompt the ‘perfection’ of equality in the sense 
of creation of equality of access to formal relationship statuses, and therefore could reject the 
stance that a state can rely on sexual orientation to create differentiation between same and 
different-sex couples as to providing such access.  
 
Creating such symmetry of access by extending civil partnerships to different-sex couples is 
significant, partly because the label accorded to a formal relationship status matters. 7  In 
principle, the ‘intrinsic value’ of such formalisation8 is diminished where that status does not 
express the identity of a couple in terms of the signalling of their relationship to others. The 
worth of civil partnerships as a particular, more neutral, less gendered, ‘blank canvas’ 9 
conception of the public expression of a relationship, untainted or less tainted by patriarchal 
or religious associations, should be able to find some purchase in a debate that has 
understandably been dominated by the demand for same-sex marriage. Self-evidently, 
however, whether an institution is termed marriage or civil partnership cannot by itself 
change the content of the relationship. Equal access to civil partnerships cannot be presented 
as a panacea linked to excising fully the ills flowing from the more value-laden institution of 
marriage, given structural inequalities in society influencing the nature of interpersonal 
relationships. But making civil partnerships available to different-sex couples could aid in 
breaking down the religious/patriarchal force of marriage by giving individuals the option of 
avoiding it without disproportionate loss.   
 
It is further argued that if state denial of equal access to a formal relationship status on 
grounds of sexual orientation offends against equality values, it therefore also engages that of 
dignity10 which has been found to underlie Article 8 as an aspect of the ‘very essence of the 
                                                 
6 For further consideration of such asymmetry arising across ECHR Member States, see H Fenwick and A 
Hayward, ‘Rejecting asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses for same and different-sex couples at 
Strasbourg and domestically’ [2017] 6 EHRLR 544. 
7 Steinfeld and Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [45] 
(Arden LJ). See also Mikulić v Croatia [2002] ECHR 27 at [53]: ‘[private life under Article 8] can sometimes 
embrace aspects of an individual’s social identity’, and Pretty v United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [61]. 
8 The Court has found that formal civil unions have an ‘intrinsic value’ for persons regardless of the legal effects 
they produce: Vallianatos v Greece (2014) 59 EHRR 12 at [81], Oliari and others v Italy (2017) 65 EHRR 26 at 
[174]. 
9 See R v Bala and others [2016] EWCA Crim 560, [2016] 3 WLR 1379 where Davis LJ, at [38], referred to 
civil partnerships as a ‘construct of statute’.  
10 See N Bamforth, ‘Same-sex partnerships: some comparative constitutional lessons’ [2007] 1 EHRLR 47, 54; 
Bamforth argues, in the context of defending formalisation of same-sex unions, that there is a ‘dependence of 
equality on deeper values’.    
4 
 
Convention’,11 and to form the ‘foundation of all the freedoms’ protected by international 
human rights law. 12  The suggestion that the notion of dignity provides a key to the 
understanding of discrimination finds support from a range of writers.13 It is argued that state 
denial of a choice as to a particular formalisation of a relationship need not be seen as in itself 
an assault on a couple’s dignity, but that such an assault could be said to arise due to denial of 
an equal choice as to formal partnership status on grounds of sexual orientation.14 The value 
of equal treatment in this context may be viewed as linked to furtherance of the value of 
dignity and freedom of choice, understood – as articulated in Goodwin v UK15 in relation to 
Article 8 – as ‘the right to establish details of [one’s] identity as individual human beings’ 
and in Obergefell as a formal recognition of the dignity of the bond of a couple.16  If a couple 
on grounds of sexual orientation has open to them only one formal relationship status 
inimical to them, and therefore unavailable to them as an effective option, then the values of 
dignity and freedom of choice essential to the notion of identity, are undermined. The unique 
situation that has arisen in England, Wales and Scotland whereby the civil partnership status 
was maintained after the introduction of same-sex marriage has enabled the creation of a 
‘civil-partner’ identity. Thus equality of state recognition of relationships via the introduction 
of same-sex marriage, although an important aspect of dignity,17 is not exhaustive of it. For 
individuals who have chosen to identify as ‘civil partners’ this decision carries an intrinsic 
dignity that is distinct from the dignity of such recognition.  
 
                                                 
11 See Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1 at [65]. 
12 By Lord Dyson in RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees intervening) [2012] UKSC 38, relying on the references to dignity in the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights at [29]-[30], [39]. See further D Feldman, ‘Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 
I’ [1999] Public Law 682, 688. 
13 See C McCrudden, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 The European 
Journal of International Law  655, 681, 683, 684, 686; T Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2015) p6; J Costa, ‘Human Dignity in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human 
Rights’ in C McCrudden (ed.), Understanding Human Dignity - Proceedings of the British Academy (2013) pp. 
393-402; N Bamforth, ‘Same-sex partnerships: some comparative constitutional lessons’ [2007] 1 EHRLR 47, 
53-56. 
14 See, in a different context, Baroness Hale in Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557 
at [131]-[132]. 
15 Christine Goodwin v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 18 at [90]. 
16 See Obergefell v Hodges 576 US (2015) June 26 at [28]: ‘There is dignity in the bond between two men or 
two women who seek to marry…’. So exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage was found to amount to an 
assault on their dignity. See also the observations of Sachs J in Minister of Home Affairs and Another v Fourie 
and Another (CCT 60/04) [2005] ZACC 19 noting, at [71], that such exclusion ‘reinforces the wounding notion 
that they are to be treated as biological oddities, as failed or lapsed human beings who do not fit into normal 
society, and, as such, do not qualify for the full moral concern and respect that our Constitution seeks to secure 
for everyone’.  
17 N Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame Law Review 183, 257-58. 
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That final point is addressed in Part 3 which seeks to demonstrate that equality-based 
arguments alone are inherently limited as compared to dignity-based ones, given that in order 
to address the discrimination against different-sex couples to be argued for in the Supreme 
Court in Steinfeld the option of mere abolition of civil partnerships could be taken by the 
government in response to that decision or to its own ongoing review. So doing would 
obviously deprive different-sex couples of that option, but, more significantly, it would also 
have a highly detrimental impact on same-sex couples currently in civil partnerships. It 
could, further, affect all same-sex couples ideologically opposed to marriage more 
detrimentally than it would affect different-sex couples who are so opposed. One of the 
purposes of this article, then, is to explore that so far unexplored dimension of the debate 
surrounding Steinfeld - the detrimental impact of abolition of civil partnerships on same-sex 
couples, bearing the history of the struggle for acceptance of formalisation of same-sex 
relationships in mind, and the particular meaning of that status for same-sex couples. If that 
option was taken, the movement towards ‘perfecting’ equality between same and different-
sex couples in terms of providing equal access to formal relationship statuses which this 
article traces, would in one sense have achieved success. Symmetry of access to such statuses 
would be created: same and different-sex couples would each be able to access one 
formalised status only. But such a finding, it will be argued, would disregard both the 
possible indirectly discriminatory impact on same-sex couples currently in civil partnerships 
and the concomitant assault on their dignity as recognised under Article 8 ECHR that could 
be deemed to arise if their relationship status was abolished.  
 
1. THE EQUALITY RATIONALE UNDERLYING FORMAL RECOGNITION OF 
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIPS 
 
In England and Wales the dominant focal point in the historical development of family law 
and, indeed, the very definition of what constitutes a family, has been marriage. 18  Its 
historical association with the creation of gender inequality has been canvassed frequently:19 
over the centuries, marriage enjoyed a systematic prioritisation in law due to its association 
with propriety and with patriarchal values arising from its Christian heritage,20 along with the 
                                                 
18 See S Poulter, ‘The Definition of Marriage in English Law’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 409. 
19 See R Auchmuty, ‘What’s So Special about Marriage? The Impact of Wilkinson v Kitzinger’ [2008] CFLQ 
475 and R Harding, ‘Sir Mark Potter and the Protection of the Traditional Family: Why Same Sex Marriage is 
(Still) a Feminist Issue’ (2007) 15 Fem LS 223.  
20 See Ephesians 5:23: ‘For a husband is the head of his wife as Christ is the head of the church’. 
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perceived stability it offered for the procreation and rearing of children, and the legal 
certainty it produced through insistence on compliance with formalities for its creation.21 
More recently, marriage, and in particular its privileged status, has been subject to critical 
scrutiny,22 and, as noted recently by the Court of Appeal in Owens v Owens, the institution 
has incrementally evolved to reflect the marital state as an equal partnership, thereby 
distancing itself, formally speaking, from its paternalistic and patriarchal origins. 23  The 
widespread dismantling of the legal consequences of coverture (in particular, the doctrine of 
unity that subsumed the wife’s legal identity and existence within that of the husband),24 the 
introduction of no-fault divorce,25 the shift from rights to responsibilities in relation to the 
upbringing of children,26 the recognition of domestic contributions within the division of 
assets upon divorce27 and, more recently, the introduction of same-sex marriage, have all 
contributed to the development of this more egalitarian vision of marriage. As a consequence, 
Lord Penzance’s Christianity-based and long-celebrated ‘definition’ of marriage as ‘the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others’ now 
requires considerable revision.28 Nevertheless, as mentioned above, it cannot be assumed 
from the viewpoint of a number of feminists that the historical association between marriage 
and patriarchy has been entirely undermined; from that viewpoint as an institution it is 
fundamentally tainted, and however much it has developed it cannot fully purge itself of that 
association.29 Despite changes in the nature of marriage (both legal and social) since the first- 
and second-wave feminist critiques, it still, to a significant number of couples,30 brings with it 
                                                 
21 This was particularly the case after Lord Hardwicke’s Marriage Act 1753; see R Probert, Marriage Law and 
Practice in the Long Eighteenth Century: A Reassessment (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
22 See, for example, E Clive, ‘Marriage: an unnecessary legal concept?’ in J Eekelaar and S Katz, Marriage and 
Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies (Butterworths, 1980) and MA Fineman, ‘Why Marriage?’ (2001) 9 Va 
J Soc. Policy Law 239.  
23 [2017] EWCA Civ 182, [2017] 4 WLR 74 at [89] (Sir James Munby).  
24 See A Hayward, ‘The Married Women’s Property Act 1882’ in E Rackley and R Auchmuty, Women’s Legal 
Landmarks: Celebrating 100 Years of Women and Law in the UK and Ireland (Hart, 2018). 
25 See Divorce Reform Act 1969, as consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 ss 1(2)(d)-(e).  
26 See Children Act 1989, especially the welfare principle and the concept of parental responsibility. 
27 See Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, Pt II and for ‘big money’ cases, see White v White [2001] 1 AC 596, 
[2001] 1 AC 596 and the creation of the ‘yardstick of equality’. 
28 Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 1 P&D 130, 130. See R Probert, ‘Hyde v Hyde: Defining or Defending Marriage?’ 
[2007] CFLQ 322. 
29 See N Barker, Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012) and C Chambers, Against Marriage: An Egalitarian Defence of the Marriage-Free State (Oxford 
University Press, 2017) especially pp13-27. 
30  On the popularity of different-sex civil partnerships in the Netherlands, see Central Bureau Statistics, 
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2016/23/minder-huwelijken-meer-partnerschappen (in Dutch). For a similar 
view in France, see L Francoz Terminal, ‘From same-sex couples to same-sex families? Current French legal 
issues’ [2009] 21(4) CFLQ 485 and L Francoz Terminal, ‘Registered Partnership in France’ in JM Scherpe and 
A Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships – Family Recognition beyond Marriage? (Intersentia, 2017).  
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patriarchal and heteronormative associations,31 although it is not suggested that heterosexuals 
seeking civil partnerships would always choose them on that basis.32 Similarly, while some 
academics accept that the availability of same-sex marriage has dismantled the patriarchal 
structures of marriage,33 others envisage continued resistance to that institution,34 especially 
as the promotion of marriage may marginalise the legal recognition of other relationships of 
care and dependency.35  
 
Thus some heterosexual women seeking formalisation of their relationship would reject the 
label ‘wife’, both as non-reflective of their conception of their role in their relationship with 
their partner, and as an inaccurate signalling of the nature of their relationship to others. It 
clearly goes beyond what could be offered by a civil partnership as opposed to marriage to 
expect that gendered roles would necessarily be discarded merely by entering that status 
rather than that of civil marriage. As Katharine O’Donovan pointed out in one of the very 
earliest feminist legal analyses of marriage, individuals may be slotted into state-ordained 
roles, however hard they seek to avoid them in the ways they lead their lives.36 For example, 
the unavailability of affordable childcare might mean that the woman, whether in a civil 
partnership or a marriage, had to stay at home to care for children or elders, forcing her into 
economic dependence on her partner. However, the rejection of the role of ‘wife’ by the 
woman who had the choice of entering a civil partnership could aid in signalling to those 
around her, including her partner, that from the outset of their formalised relationship, the 
expectations of economic inequality between husband and wife associated with wifehood 
would not apply. So a lack of affordable childcare would not necessarily give rise to the 
expectation that she would be the partner forced into economic dependency. Moreover, 
                                                 
31 For a contrary view, see MA Case, ‘What feminists have to lose in same-sex marriage litigation’ (2010) 57 
UCLA Law Review 1199. She argues that the entry of same-sex couples into marriage has completed a 
longstanding process of dismantling the patriarchal structure of marriage. But see S Jeffreys, ‘The Need to 
Abolish Marriage’ (2004) 14(2) Feminism & Psychology 327, R Auchmuty, ‘Same-Sex Marriage Revived: 
Feminist Critique and Legal Strategy’ (2004) 14(1) Feminism & Psychology 101 and N Barker, Not the 
Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex Marriage (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
32 See A Barlow and J Smithson, ‘Legal assumptions, cohabitants’ talk and the rocky road to reform’ [2010] 
CFLQ 328 where the authors, at 336, identify one group of cohabitants as ‘ideologues’, meaning that one or 
both partners object to contracting a marriage. Different-sex partners also within that group would therefore be 
most likely to favour a civil partnership, if they were able to enter one.  
33 See MA Case, ‘What feminists have to lose in same-sex marriage litigation’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 
1199. 
34  C Young and S Boyd, ‘Losing the Feminist Voice? Debates on the Legal Recognition of Same Sex 
Partnerships in Canada’ (2006) 14(2) Fem LS 213. 
35 J Butler, ‘Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?’ (2002) 8 Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies 369. 
36 K O’Donovan, ‘The male appendage: Legal definitions of women’ in S Burman (ed) Fit Work for Women 
(Croom Helm, 1979) p135-6. 
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rejection of the role of wife, not only by cohabitants but by heterosexual female civil 
partners, could have an impact on society’s endorsement or acceptance of gendered economic 
inequality within marriage. If some such impact were not anticipated, the opposition to 
different-sex civil partnerships coming from conservative religious groups in Europe37 might 
be more puzzling, bearing in mind their allegiance to male ‘headship’ which is inevitably 
associated with economic inequality between husbands and wives.  
 
(a) The Civil Partnership model: separate but equal? 
 
The introduction of civil partnerships in 2005 under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 was a 
game-changing moment for domestic family law. By creating another formalised status to 
exist alongside marriage, England and Wales, in company with a number of other European 
countries,38 demonstrated that marriage was not the only legal status through which couples 
could publicly express an intimate relationship and obtain civic benefits. The earliest 
iterations of the civil partnership model in England and Wales were initially motivated by a 
commitment to addressing discrimination against couples on grounds of sexual orientation, 
but also, somewhat ironically (in light of the outcome), by a desire to offer different-sex 
couples a choice as to formalisation of their relationships.39  
 
The principle of equality featured prominently in the Parliamentary debates on an earlier 
Civil Partnerships Bill introduced by Lord Lester of Herne Hill. Supporting the Bill, Lord 
Dholakia remarked that ‘[e]quality is at the heart of our democratic process’,40 while Lord 
Rennard rejected the assertion that the core principles of the Bill were complex, asserting 
instead that ‘[t]he principle is simple: this is an issue of human rights and equality before the 
law’.41 Clearly, however, Parliamentary insistence on creating equality between same and 
different-sex couples did not extend at the time to creating full symmetry of access to formal 
                                                 
37 On the opposition of the Austrian Catholic Church, see Deutsche Welle, ‘Austrian Straight Couple Applies 
for Gay Marriage’, 16 February 2010. See also A McSmith and S Morrision, ‘Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin 
Welby, abandons his support for civil partnerships for heterosexual couples’, The Independent, 18 May 2013.  
38 See L Nielson, ‘Family Rights and the “Registered Partnership” in Denmark’ (1990) 4 (3) IJLF 297 and I 
Lund-Andersen, ‘The Danish Registered Partnership Act, 1989: Has the Act Meant a Change in Attitudes?’ in R 
Wintemute and M Andenaes, Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2001). For a more recent comparative analysis, see JM Scherpe and A 
Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships – Family Recognition beyond Marriage? (Intersentia, 2017). 
39  On precursors to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 see the House of Commons Research Paper, The 
Relationships (Civil Registration) Bill and the Civil Partnerships Bill (Bill 36 of 2001-02 and HL Bill 41 of 
2001-02) (London, 2002). 
40 Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 630, col 1719 (25 January 2002). 
41 Ibid, col 1726. 
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relationship statuses, given that same-sex marriage was not proposed alongside civil 
partnerships. That lacuna in the debate was then in effect replicated in the Marriage (Same 
Sex Couples) Act 2013, in the sense that it led to asymmetry of such access, this time largely 
to the disadvantage of different-sex couples, as discussed further below.  
 
In the run-up to the introduction of the 2004 Act, the equality rationale continued to dominate 
the discourse surrounding civil partnerships. The value of allowing symmetry of access to 
formalisations of relationships to different-sex couples, however, no longer featured in the 
debates, on the basis that the key objective was to address discrimination against couples on 
the basis of their sexual orientation.42 The decision was taken to exclude different-sex couples 
from the proposals, since, according to the Consultation, they were in a significantly different 
position ‘from that of same sex couples who wish to formalise their relationships but 
currently are unable to do so’.43  
 
Despite some legal protections existing at that time for same-sex couples,44 civil partnerships 
were viewed as ‘an important equality measure’ that would contribute to a process of cultural 
change in relation to attitudes towards same-sex relationships.45 In the Parliamentary debates 
on the Civil Partnership Bill the furtherance of equality between same and different-sex 
couples was widely cited as the key motivation behind the reform alongside conscious 
acknowledgment of human rights obligations.46 Lord Beaumont, adopting the common stance 
of downplaying the financial elements of the proposal, stated that the Bill was ‘not about 
economics…it [was] about human rights and justice’.47 As a result, the arguably imprecise 
references to general equality and social justice in the earlier Parliamentary debates began to 
be anchored to direct references to Article 14 ECHR and the recently introduced Human 
Rights Act.  Lord Lester, for example, found: 
 
                                                 
42 Although note that the Civil Partnership Act 2004 is not structured around an individual’s sexual orientation 
but rather around his/her gender.  
43 Department for Trade and Industry, Civil Partnership: A Legal Framework for the Legal Recognition of Same 
Sex Couples (London, 2003) p 13. 
44 See the domestic violence protections in Part IV of the Family Law Act 1996, protections in relation to 
tenancy succession (Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association [2001] 1 AC 27, [1999] 3 WLR 1113, and 
Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557) and the Adoption and Children Act 2002. 
45 Department for Trade and Industry, Civil Partnership: A Legal Framework for the Legal Recognition of Same 
Sex Couples (London, 2003) p 13. 
46 Equality was cited as a key motivation by Baroness Gould (Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 660, col 402 (22 
April 2004)) and Lord Haskell (Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 660, col 418 (22 April 2004)).  
47 Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 662, col 1406-28 (24 June 2004). 
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‘…the Bill seeks to give effect to a basic human right…a right to equal treatment 
without discrimination in one’s private life…a fundamental human right guaranteed 
by the ECHR [and HRA]’.48 
 
This engagement with the ECHR, and the deployment of equality-based arguments to justify 
the introduction of civil partnerships, intensified following the introduction of same-sex 
marriage, and currently features prominently in the campaign for different-sex civil 
partnerships.  
 
Thus, after the introduction of civil partnerships, in terms of the conferral of civic benefits, 
equality was largely attained since civil marriage provided the foundational model. But in 
terms of the formalisation ceremony, the terminology used, and the treatment of the sexual 
relationship between the partners, a contradictory emphasis on creating differentiation 
between civil partnerships and civil marriage emerged.49 Civil marriage, therefore, was not 
fully deployed as the model in terms of its ‘recognition’ elements: civil partnerships were 
accorded a distinct status under the Act, which created a bespoke structure for their 
recognition, reliant on a terminology differing from that used by civil marriage.50 Also, unlike 
civil marriage, which uses specific vows, and inherits much of the legacy of religious 
marriage in terms of its ceremonial aspect, civil partnerships are contracted through the 
simple act of registration; potentially they can be conducted in silence.51 Furthermore, aspects 
of the legal response pertaining to the sexual relationship between spouses were not carried 
over into civil partnerships, as revealed in the inability of civil partners to apply for 
dissolution of their partnerships in the light of their partners’ adultery, or to seek a decree of 
nullity on the basis of the inability of either party to consummate the partnership, or on the 
basis of the respondent’s wilful refusal.52 In this sense, the sexual element was excised from 
civil partnerships, thereby creating differentiation between the institutions of partnerships and 
                                                 
48 Hansard, Lords Debates, vol 663, col 391-418 (1 July 2004). 
49 On the exchange of customs, ceremonies and rituals between marriage and civil partnerships see E Peel, 
‘Civil Partnership Ceremonies: (Hetero)normativity, Ritual and Gender’ in J Miles, P Mody and R Probert, 
Marriage Rites and Rights, (Hart Publishing, 2015) 99. 
50 For example, civil partners dissolve their civil partnerships as opposed to divorcing. 
51 See S Cretney, Same Sex Relationships: From ‘Odious Crime’ to ‘Gay Marriage’ (Oxford University Press, 
2005) p 23. Note, however, that the distinction may break down in practice since, provided the default elements 
are met, couples may customise their ceremonies.  
52 However, it should be noted that a civil partner’s infidelity would fall within ‘unreasonable behaviour’ under 
s. 44(5)(a) Civil Partnership Act 2004. See S Cretney, ‘Sex is Important’ [2004] Fam Law 777, L Crompton, 
‘Where’s the Sex in Same-Sex Marriage’ [2013] 43 Fam Law 564 and J Herring, ‘Why Marriage Needs to be 
Less Sexy’ in J Miles, P Mody and R Probert, Marriage Rites and Rights (Hart Publishing, 2015). 
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of marriage, reflecting the sustained and lengthy celebration of the marital status as a sexual 
and procreative union.53 In this sense, differentiation was also created between the protective 
and the expressive aspects of the civil partnership status.  
 
(b) Introducing same-sex marriage: equality achieved? 
 
The ban on same-sex marriage came under increasing pressure and once again the equality 
rationale rather than dignity-based arguments provided the driving force for change: a 
governmental view emerged to the effect that the ghettoization of formal relationships by 
sexual orientation, reserving civil partnership to same-sex couples, and marriage to different-
sex ones, was perpetuating ‘misconceptions and discrimination’.54 Similarly, the principle of 
equality also featured prominently in the Parliamentary debates on the Marriage (Same Sex 
Couples) Bill 2013. In particular, speaking for the Coalition government, Maria Miller, then 
Minister for Women and Equalities, asserted that ‘Parliament should value people equally in 
the law, and enabling same-sex couples to marry removes the current differentiation and 
distinction’.55 There was widespread support from the Opposition; Labour’s Yvette Cooper 
MP viewed same-sex marriage as ‘the next step for equality’56 and called for Parliament to 
stand up against ‘discrimination and…for the interests of equality’.57  
 
However, despite the use of equality rhetoric in Parliament, equality was not fully achieved 
between same and different-sex couples who marry. Whilst the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) 
Act 2013 begins in section 1(1) with the short, simple and permissive provision that the 
‘[m]arriage of same sex couples is lawful’, the ensuing provisions largely undercut that 
sentiment and detail extensive exceptions to the rule. These restrictions, constituting Maria 
Miller’s so-called Quadruple Lock, were to ensure protection for religious organisations that 
did not wish to officiate for same-sex ceremonies, meaning that while equal civil marriage 
exists in England and Wales, a religious same-sex wedding can only take place provided that 
the religious organisation consents and opts into the statutory scheme. Furthermore, whilst 
the civic benefits afforded as between same and different-sex married couples, and between 
civil partners and married couples, were rendered largely comparable, there was, as 
                                                 
53 See the observations in Wilkinson v Kitzinger (No 2) [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2007] 1 FLR 295 at [118] 
(Potter P). 
54 Government Equalities Office Equal Civil Marriage: A Consultation, (London, 2012) p 1.  
55 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 558, col 125 (5 February 2013).  
56 Ibid, col 136. 
57 Ibid, col 137. 
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mentioned above, a significant point of divergence relating to occupational pension 
schemes.58 Whereas a heterosexual spouse had access to a survivor’s pension entitlement 
dating back to the point at which contributions started, a civil partner (and subsequently a 
same-sex spouse) could not access benefits accrued by their partner before 5 December 2005, 
the date on which the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force.59 This inequality was 
subsequently removed by a unanimous Supreme Court in Walker v Innospec Ltd and others, 
after Walker challenged Innospec’s refusal in 2006 to agree to his pension being paid to his 
then civil partner (and now spouse).60 Lord Kerr accepted that European Union Law did not 
compel Member States to recognise same-sex civil partnerships or marriage, but, given their 
presence in the UK, and in order to avoid provision of illusory protection for couples, he 
found that ‘formal equality for same sex couples will always be deficient if they are unable to 
avail themselves of the legal benefits attendant on marriage.’61 The Court accordingly made a 
declaration that the relevant provision in the Equality Act 2010 was incompatible with 
European Union law and must be disapplied, thereby generating a pension entitlement for 
Walker’s husband. By disapplying this provision, another distinction in the legal treatment of 
same and different-sex couples was removed in a significant step towards ensuring full 
equality. 
 
But clearly a further very significant inequality remains – the main subject of this article: in 
considering the bases for the formal recognition of partnerships, it was decided that civil 
partnerships should be retained, since it was found that many of the respondents to the Equal 
Civil Marriage Consultation valued them.62 But the Government did not support extension of 
civil partnerships to different-sex couples on the basis that a need for their introduction could 
not be identified from the Consultation.63 Once again therefore the attempt to capture equal 
respect for relationship forms in legislation failed to achieve full equality since equal access 
to relationship formalisations for same and different-sex couples was denied. This failure was 
highlighted in the Parliamentary debates, particularly following a proposed amendment to the 
Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill that would have extended civil partnerships to different-
                                                 
58 See the House of Commons Briefing Paper, Pensions: civil partnerships and same sex marriages (London, 
2015). 
59 See Equality Act 2010, Sch 9, para 18 as subsequently amended by Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, 
Schedule 4(6), para 17(2). 
60 [2017] UKSC 47, [2017] 4 All ER 1004.  
61 Ibid, at [18]. 
62 HM Government, Equal Marriage: The Government’s Response (London, 2012) p 11. 
63 Ibid. 
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sex couples.64 Arguing in support of the amendment, Caroline Lucas MP considered that the 
extension would ‘promote equality’ and would ‘allow everyone – same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples - to enjoy a civil partnership or marriage’. 65  Although ultimately defeated, the 
amendment would have more fully embraced the equality rationale, not only as a motivating 
force behind the introduction of same-sex marriage, but also since symmetry of access to 
formal relationship statuses would have been achieved. This defeat arguably arose as a result 
of the attempt by the government on the one hand to placate Stonewall, an LGBT 
organisation in favour of retaining civil partnerships owing to their ‘special and unique 
status’,66 but on the other the Church of England, which took the stance that extension of civil 
partnerships to different-sex couples would undermine marriage.67  
 
(c) Asymmetry of access to formal relationship statuses creating discrimination 
against different-sex couples  
 
The decision to retain civil partnerships alongside same-sex marriage produced the current 
anomalous situation of discriminating against different-sex couples since on the basis of 
sexual orientation (although formally on the basis of gender) such couples cannot access a 
particular formal relationship status which is open to same-sex couples. Following a public 
consultation, the Department for Culture, Media and Sport released a Report in 201468 which 
found that a majority of respondents were in favour of retaining civil partnerships for same-
sex couples69  but were against their extension to different-sex couples.70  The arguments 
proffered against extension centred on the risk that different-sex civil partnerships would 
undermine the institution of marriage and that those seeking them due to the religious nature 
of marriage could readily enter into a fully secular civil marriage. Conversely, those in favour 
                                                 
64 The proposed amendment, Clause 10, introduced on 20 May 2013 and tabled by Tim Loughton MP. 
65 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 563, col 1001 (20 May 2013). 
66 Stonewall, Official Statement, 2010. See also J Geen, ‘Stonewall says it will campaign for gay marriage’ 
PinkNews 27 October 2010. 
67 See R Wintemute, ‘Civil partnership and discrimination in R (Steinfeld) v Secretary of State for Education’ 
[2016] CFLQ 365, 367. 
68  Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): Report on 
Conclusions (London, 2014). 
69 Ibid, para 2.3 noting 55% of respondent in favour, 30% against, with 16% holding no view. 
70 When asked whether civil partnerships should be extended to different-sex couples, 76% of respondents were 
against with 22% in favour: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, ibid, para 2.12. Note that the remaining 
2% of respondents held no view.  
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argued the case almost entirely from a non-discrimination perspective,71 illustrating the extent 
to which the pursuit of equality had influenced the discourse surrounding civil partnership 
reform.  
 
In light of the Report’s conclusion that no changes were to be made, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that further impetus for reform arose in the wake of the 2013 Act. The 
perception that equality values had been violated by the creation of asymmetry of access to 
formal relationship statuses for couples based on sexual orientation was the driving force 
behind Tim Loughton’s Private Member’s Bill put forward originally in 2015, and in a 
modified form in 2017, intended to effect extension of civil partnerships to different-sex 
couples.72 When advocating the changes in his Bill, Tim Loughton MP stated that same-sex 
marriage had:  
 
‘…created a new inequality, and a Government who argued zealously that same-sex 
marriage was an equality issue seem to have rather lost interest when it comes to an 
equality that affects opposite-sex couples’.73  
 
The latest iteration of the Bill passed its Second Reading in February 2018,74 but rather than 
proposing, as originally planned, textual amendments to the Civil Partnership Act 2004 in 
order to extend civil partnerships to different-sex couples, it had been watered down so as 
merely to compel the Secretary of State to compile a Report assessing the future of civil 
partnerships. Victoria Atkins MP, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, affirmed in the Second Reading that a Report will be presented to Parliament 
following a full public consultation that analyses the current uptake of civil partnership and 
same-sex marriage, conversion statistics, surveys as to the demand for civil partnerships by 
different-sex couples, and the experience of other jurisdictions when reforming this area of 
law.75  The Government envisages that it will have ‘a proportionate amount of data’ by 
September 2019.76  
                                                 
71 See the observation from the Report that ‘[a]lmost no respondents mentioned benefits other than in terms of 
advancing equality if civil partnerships were opened up to opposite sex couples’: Department for Culture, Media 
and Sport, ibid, para 2.30.  
72 See the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Amendment) Bill 2016-2017.  
73 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 619, col 639 (13 January 2017). 
74 See the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Bill 2017-19. 
75 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 635, col 1121 (2 February 2018). 
76 Ibid, col 1122. 
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Extension of civil partnerships to different-sex couples was also the subject over the same 
period of time of the court action in Steinfeld, as discussed below, relying on Articles 8 and 
14 ECHR, and on developments in formal recognition of relationships at Strasbourg. That is 
the matter to which this article now turns, on the basis that the Steinfeld litigation may 
eventually prove more likely than legislative action to create a driver for change. While it was 
never very likely that the Loughton Bill would lead directly to the introduction of different-
sex civil partnerships, the change it has undergone in its most recent iteration may have 
rendered that prospect even more remote, unless further impetus to do so arises from 
Steinfeld.   
 
2. JUXTAPOSING THE STRASBOURG ARTICLE 8 AND 14 JURISPRUDENCE WITH 
SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP LEGISLATION IN ENGLAND AND WALES: 
STEINFELD AND KEIDAN 
 
As discussed, the advent of the HRA, drawing Articles 8 and 14 ECHR into domestic law, 
encouraged equality-based arguments to influence the re-shaping of state recognition of 
relationships. The current domestic conception of formal recognition of partnerships as 
captured legislatively has shown a greater and more flexible capacity to absorb such 
arguments, reflected under Articles 8 and 14 ECHR, than has the Strasbourg Court77 due to 
its structural position as an international court. It might appear then that such arguments 
would be likely to have little potential impact on the current domestic conception of formal 
recognition of partnerships. The discussion below, however, finds that arguments arising 
those Articles could still have a more dynamic impact in the domestic courts in triggering 
development of that recognition, given that the restraining margin of appreciation doctrine 
has no application in domestic law. The domestic semi-equivalent of that doctrine, according 
a ‘discretionary area of judgment’, may tend to exert a lesser restraining impact, since, unlike 
the Strasbourg Court, the UK Supreme Court need not concern itself with the reception of its 
judgments in states with a record of weaker adherence to the ECHR. Thus it has less need to 
exercise self-restraint. This point is pursued below.    
 
                                                 
77 Andrews J noted this explicitly at first instance in Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education 
[2016] EWHC 128, [2016] 4 WLR 41 at [53]. This may be said given that the Strasbourg Court has not found a 
right to same-sex marriage under Article 12, either read with 14 or alone: see Oliari and others v Italy (2015) 65 
EHRR 957. 
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Reference to equality-based arguments under the ECHR became the driving force behind the 
Steinfeld litigation. The anomalous situation outlined above that has arisen in England and 
Wales 78  whereby, while same-sex couples can access marriage or a civil partnership, 
heterosexual ones can only access marriage, gave rise to the challenge in Steinfeld by the two 
claimants, a couple in a committed long-term heterosexual relationship, with two children. 
They are challenging their exclusion from the civil partnership status since they are seeking 
to formalise their relationship, but do not want to marry due their strong ideological 
objections to the institution of marriage, as imbued with historical patriarchal trappings. They 
view civil partnership as a status that reflects their values and recognises the equality of their 
relationship. Moreover, they point to the fact that a significant number of people share their 
view that marriage remains tainted by religious and patriarchal associations.79 In pursuit of 
their claim they are relying on Articles 8 and 14 ECHR under the HRA, and arguing that they 
are being discriminated against on grounds of their sexual orientation since a same-sex 
couple could contract marriage under the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, but could 
also enter a civil partnership instead.  
 
(a) The ‘ambit’ argument under the ‘respect for family life’ aspect of Article 8(1) 
 
In order to invoke Article 14 it must be shown that the claim in question falls within the 
ambit of a substantive Convention Article, in this instance Article 8. It is not necessary for the 
other right to be breached, and in general the enquiry is only as to the scope of that other 
right, not as to the nature of the interference that has occurred in terms of detriment to the 
applicant.80 In the High Court Andrews J found, relying on domestic case-law, that to come 
within the ambit of Article 8(1) the claimant ‘must establish that a personal interest close to 
the core’ of the right in question…is infringed by the difference in treatment complained 
of’.81 She relied on the House of Lords’ decision in M v Secretary of State for Work and 
                                                 
78 Scotland is in a similar position. See the Review of Civil Partnership: Scottish Government Response to 
Consultation, 21 November 2017, stating that no action will be taken until further research is undertaken on the 
impact of same-sex marriage and the demand for different-sex civil partnerships. 
79 The campaign is backed by a Change.org petition, Open Civil Partnerships to All, which as of March 2018 
has just over 125,000 signatures. See also Equal Civil Partnerships, ‘Why Does it Matter?’ available at 
http://equalcivilpartnerships.org.uk/why-does-it-matter/ . 
80 See Petrovic v Austria (2001) 33 EHRR 14. See also JM Scherpe, ‘Family and Private Life, Ambits and 
Pieces – M v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions’ [2007] 19(3) CFLQ 32 and C Fenton-Glynn, ‘Opposite 
Sex Civil Partnerships and the Ambit of Article 8’ (2016) 46 Fam Law (Last Orders). 
81 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128, [2016] 4 WLR 41 at [25], emphasis 
added. 
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Pensions,82 in which the impact of a statutory scheme relating to child support contributions 
was linked to the applicant’s status as part of a same-sex relationship, but the House of Lords 
found that its impact was not connected closely enough to the core values of Article 8(1). 
Therefore if Article 8(1) was not engaged, Article 14 could not be either. Relying on M 
Andrews J found that in denying Steinfeld and Keidan the right to enter into a civil 
partnership ‘the state has done nothing to interfere with their love, trust, confidence, or 
mutual dependence and has placed no constraints on their social intercourse’.83 So she viewed 
the ability to enter a civil partnership as peripheral under Article 8(1). 
 
Taking account of Wilkinson v Kitzinger and another84 in which a same-sex couple lawfully 
married in Canada unsuccessfully contended that the statutory provisions of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act 1973 and of the 2004 Act precluding recognition of their union as a marriage, but 
treating it instead as a civil partnership, infringed Article 14 read together with Article 8, 
Andrew J further noted that Steinfeld and Keidan had not been denied any possibility of 
attaining formal state recognition of their relationship 85  since they could achieve such 
recognition via civil marriage. She found that the relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence 86 
supported the proposition that detriment due to the lack of formal state recognition of 
relationships was needed, given that the applicants in question under that jurisprudence had 
also had no other means available to them of formalising their relationships.  
 
The Court of Appeal, however, found unanimously that the barrier to access of different-sex 
couples to civil partnerships did fall within the ambit of Article 8(1).87 As Arden LJ pointed 
out, the position at Strasbourg as to its ambit appears to differ strongly from that put forward 
in M. She noted that in Oliari and others v Italy88 the Strasbourg Court had ‘specifically 
rejected the argument that…the applicants had to show that they suffered any loss as a result 
of not being able to enter a civil union’.89 In Oliari the Court had not found it necessary to 
point to any specific detriment caused to the applicants’ closeness or inter-dependency due to 
                                                 
82 [2006] UKHL 11, [2006] 2 WLR 637. 
83 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128, [2016] 4 WLR 41 at [37]. 
84 [2006] EWHC 2022 (Fam), [2006] 2 FLR 397. 
85 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128, [2016] 4 WLR 41 at [36]. 
86 See Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 and Vallianatos v Greece (2014) 59 EHRR 12.  
87 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [25]-
[46].  
88 (2015) 65 EHRR 957. 
89 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [29] 
referring to Oliari at [70]-[71].  
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their exclusion from a formal framework protective of their relationships in order to bring 
them within the ambit of Article 8(1).90 Thus the Court of Appeal definitively rejected the 
idea that a detrimental impact on the applicants of the non-availability of a means of 
formalising the relationship was necessary to bring the situation within the ambit of Article 8. 
Clearly, the applicants in Oliari had suffered detriment – but that was not part of the ambit 
argument.  
 
Arden LJ also rejected the argument that the applicants could marry on the basis that the 
detrimental impact on the applicants of the non-availability of a means of formalising their 
relationship was not the basis for the decisions cited to the Court in Schalk and Kopf v 
Austria,91 Vallianatos v Greece92 and Oliari as to ambit. In Vallianatos the applicants as a 
same-sex couple had argued that the Greek government had breached Article 8 read with 14 
due to their exclusion from accessing a formal relationship status in the form of a registered 
partnership, although such partnerships were available to different-sex couples (who could 
also access marriage). The government argued that the applicants could achieve rights via a 
cohabitation agreement, but that argument was rejected on the basis that the applicants would 
not then achieve legal recognition of their relationship – in itself of intrinsic value. Arden LJ 
considered that the Strasbourg Court would equally reject the ‘can marry’ submission as 
well,93 making the key point that marriage would not be ‘an effective option’ for the couple 
in question, given their settled beliefs.  
 
The Court of Appeal had to address the question of following M on the issue of ambit. Arden 
LJ found that the need for a ‘personal interest close to the core values of a Convention right’ 
from M to engage Article 8 would be satisfied under the current state of the case-law, as set 
out in the relevant jurisprudence, including Oliari.94 She went on to consider whether adverse 
impact was required in the instant case, and found a way of distinguishing M. She found that 
adverse impact was only required in respect of negative obligations of the state under Article 
8, not positive ones, relying on the speeches of Lords Walker and Bingham in M. Given that 
M could be characterised as a case concerning negative obligations, while Steinfeld 
                                                 
90 Oliari and others v Italy (2015) 65 EHRR 957 at [70]. 
91 (2011) 53 EHRR 20. 
92 (2014) 59 EHRR 12. 
93 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [40].  
94 Ibid, at [62].  
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concerned positive ones,95 she considered that M did not determine that adverse impact was 
required in the instant case. 
 
That argument is open to doubt since it relied on creating a novel distinction under Article 8 
jurisprudence between negative and positive obligations. Clearly, when the state breaches 
negative obligations, it is likely that detriment would accrue to the victim in any event, but a 
bright-line distinction between negative and positive obligations in terms of the need to show 
detriment in respect of the ambit of the former but not the latter is not apparent from the case-
law.96 An alternative would have been to argue on the facts that M was non-analogous to 
Steinfeld since M concerned a far less intimate area of family life – the payment of specific 
sums of money in child support - than the public expression of a relationship, as in Steinfeld. 
However, on the basis of the distinction identified the Court of Appeal was then able to find 
that the interpretation of Article 8(1) at Strasbourg in respect of positive obligations has 
changed in relation to the nature of the ambit at issue in Steinfeld since M was decided. 
  
As Arden LJ impliedly accepted, Andrews J and the judges in M and in Wilkinson mistakenly 
conflated the question of determining the ambit of the ‘family life’ aspect of Article 8(1) with 
making a determination as to the demands of necessity and proportionality under Article 8(2), 
or as to justification, under Article 14. Those matters, unlike a determination as to ambit, 
relate more closely to the question of the detriment imposed on applicants by state 
arrangements with regard to formalisation of relationships.97 Those decisions form part of a 
domestic line of case-law strongly influenced by the House of Lords’ decision in M which, in 
narrowing the domestic ambit of Article 8(1), failed to engage with the core value of respect 
for dignity in the formal expression of family relationships under Article 8(1). It is now clear 
that the fact of being in a committed same or different-sex relationship is sufficient 
domestically to engage Article 8(1): the line of jurisprudence at Strasbourg discussed by 
Arden LJ is clear and constant as to the issue of engaging Article 8(1), and has not found that 
a specific interference by the state with the love, trust, confidence, or mutual dependence of a 
couple is necessary to create such engagement. So its ambit as understood domestically has 
now been realigned with its ambit as understood at Strasbourg, bar the problematic 
                                                 
95 Ibid, at [63]-[68]. 
96 The Court has emphasised that the important matter is the fair balance to be struck between the interest of the 
individual at stake, and the interest of the community as a whole. See Hokkanen v Finland (1995) 19 EHRR 139 
at [55].  
97 Ibid, at [40].  
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distinction created between negative and positive obligations. That distinction does not, 
however, need to be maintained in the Supreme Court since it could simply overturn M on 
ambit.   
 
(b) Non-discrimination in according respect for family life 
 
Once the situation was found by Arden LJ to fall within the ambit of Article 8(1), Article 14 
was also engaged. The applicants had to point to comparators in an analogous situation,98 but 
the Court of Appeal assumed, without arguing the point, that the applicants were in a 
comparable situation to that of a same-sex couple 99  and that differential treatment had 
occurred since obviously such a couple in England and Wales could have accessed the civil 
partnership status. Arden LJ focused on the main issue, which was clearly that of justifying 
the differentiation between same and different-sex couples. Her dissenting judgment on this 
point reads like a leading judgment and made a number of significant points. She noted that if 
the differential treatment is on grounds of sexual orientation – then, following Schalk (and 
Vallianatos100 with a range of other decisions, including Karner v Austria,101 Hämäläinen v 
Finland), 102  weighty reasons would be needed to justify it, unless a wide margin of 
appreciation were to be granted because no consensus on the matter at issue was found to 
exist in Europe.103 Andrews J had found that there was no European consensus on allowing 
different-sex partners to obtain formal recognition of their relationship by a means other than 
marriage,104 and found therefore that weighty reasons would not be needed to justify the 
differentiation, concluding that even if Article 14 had been found to apply, it would not have 
been breached.  
 
                                                 
98 On the need to be in an analogous situation, see Biao v Denmark (Application no. 38590/10) decision of 24 
May 2016; Carson and Others v the United Kingdom (2010) 51 EHRR 369 at [61] and Burden v the United 
Kingdom (2008) 47 EHRR 38 at [60]. 
99 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [74]. So 
did Andrews J at [57], on the hypothetical basis that Article 14 had been engaged. 
100 (2014) 59 EHRR 12 at [77]. 
101 (2004) 38 EHRR 24 at [41]. 
102 (2014) ECHR 787. 
103 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [78]-
[79].  
104 She accepted the argument that since only a very small number of states make registered partnerships and 
marriage available to both same-sex and different-sex couples, the UK had remained within its margin of 
appreciation in settling on the current arrangement while deciding on the future of civil partnerships: Steinfeld & 
Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2016] EWHC 128, [2016] 4 WLR 41 at [69]-[70]. 
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Arden LJ took a different view. She considered whether the decision of the Secretary of State 
to wait and see how same-sex marriage would impact on civil partnerships would fall within 
her discretionary area of judgment, as argued for on her behalf.105 She accepted that the 
margin of appreciation argument would be irrelevant, given that the Court of Appeal is a 
domestic court, although she considered that the standard to be applied in considering 
justification would still be that of strict scrutiny, even if that argument had been applicable.106 
She found that the ‘wait and see’ decision did not fall within the discretionary area of 
judgment due to the importance of the prohibition of discrimination. Under strict scrutiny she 
found that the Secretary of State’s ‘wait and see’ policy failed to strike a fair balance between 
the interests at stake, and also failed the test of proportionality.107 She found that the policy 
was ‘completely open-ended, thus giving the appellants no means of knowing when their 
state of uncertainty as to formalisation of their relationship might end’.108 She also pointed 
out that the data sought by the Secretary of State as to formation of civil partnerships could 
only relate to same-sex couples, since only such couples could enter or dissolve them.109   
 
Given that Arden LJ found no justification under Article 14, she went on to consider whether 
to make a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 HRA between the bar on different-
sex couples entering a civil partnership and Article 8 read with 14. She decided not to do so, 
given that the Civil Partnership (Amendment) Bill 2015 was at the time before Parliament,110 
but instead to declare formally that the bar fell within the ambit of Article 8, and that the 
potential violation of the appellants’ rights was not justified under Article 14 by the ‘wait and 
see’ policy.   
 
Both Beatson LJ and Briggs LJ agreed with Arden LJ on the ambit of Article 8(1), but came 
to the conclusion that the ‘wait and see policy’ justified the potential discrimination under 
Article 14 on the basis that a change should not be made prematurely – by extending civil 
partnerships to different-sex couples, which might have to be reversed, wasting time and 
                                                 
105 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at [93]-
[94].  
106 Ibid, at [98].  
107 Ibid, at [110]-[127].  
108 Ibid, at [114]. 
109  Ibid, at [115]-[116]. See A Hayward, ‘Justifiable Discrimination – The Case of Opposite-Sex Civil 
Partnerships’ (2017) 76 Cambridge Law Journal 243. 
110 Although it should be noted that as a Private Member’s Bill, without Government support, it had little chance 
of making much progress in Parliament. 
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effort.111 Beatson LJ, with whom Briggs LJ agreed,112  found that the aim of the Secretary of 
State in taking time to form an assessment as to whether to extend partnerships to different-
sex couples, or abolish them, was legitimate.113 He found that different steps could be taken 
to eliminate the discrimination being suffered, and so resolution of the position was complex 
and would need time to resolve.114 He did, however, consider that while the Court should not 
micro-manage areas of social policy, and therefore a deadline for eliminating the 
discrimination by taking one of the available options should not be set, there would come a 
point at which a court would not accept that the ‘wait and see’ policy remained justifiable. It 
is notable that these conclusions were not reached on the basis of conceding a discretionary 
area of judgment to the executive. 
 
(c) A stronger focus on equality in the Supreme Court?  
 
Steinfeld has moved on to the Supreme Court.115 That court may be invited to take account of 
a case which – at a superficial glance – is similar to Steinfeld and was decided at Strasbourg 
after the Court of Appeal decision - Ratzenböck and Seydl v Austria.116 It also concerned a 
different-sex couple in a stable, committed relationship who sought to access a registered 
partnership (the Austrian equivalent of a civil partnership) rather than marriage. Shortly after 
the introduction of registered partnerships in Austria in February 2010, intended to provide 
same-sex couples with a means of formalising their relationship, the couple sought unsuc-
cessfully to register their relationship, considering that such partnerships offer a better reflec-
tion of their union and that ‘marriage was not a suitable alternative for them’.117 Their subse-
quent challenge under Articles 8, 12 and 14 ECHR failed domestically,118 and they brought it 
to the Strasbourg Court.  
 
                                                 
111 Ibid, at [173]. 
112 Ibid, at [174]-[175].   
113 Ibid, at [156].  
114 Ibid, at [157].  
115  On 8 August 2017 a panel of three Justices – Lady Hale, Lord Wilson and Lord Hughes – granted the 
Steinfeld litigants permission to appeal to the Supreme Court, with a hearing scheduled for 14-15 May 2018. 
116 Application no. 28475/12, judgment of 26 October 2017. See H Fenwick and A Hayward, ‘Equal Civil 
Partnerships: Implications of Strasbourg’s latest ruling for Steinfeld and Keidan’ UK Human Rights Blog, 21 
November 2017. 
117 Ibid, at [23]. 
118 The Austrian Constitutional Court dismissed their claim, partly on the basis that they are not part of a 
vulnerable group. The Court also took account of a lack of consensus among the contracting states on the 
matter. 
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In a brief judgment the Court, by five to two, found no breach of Article 14 read with 8, on 
the basis that, since they could marry, the applicants were not in a relevantly similar or 
comparable situation to same-sex couples who had no right to marry in Austria and needed 
the registered partnership as an alternative means of providing legal recognition to their 
relationship. Thus the claim failed at the first hurdle under Article 14: since no comparator 
was found, the Court did not need to assess the difference of treatment or the justification for 
the difference. It is argued that this judgment can readily be found to be inapplicable to the 
situation in Steinfeld. The desire of both couples to enter a civil partnership is analogous but 
the positions they are in due to the forms of asymmetry of access to formalised relationship 
statuses in the two states are not. The point of fundamental importance for the litigation in 
Steinfeld is that, unlike the position in Austria, a different form of asymmetry of access in 
England and Wales is apparent. That would be a key distinguishing feature in the Supreme 
Court since it would not be possible to argue that no comparator is available since the couple 
in Steinfeld are obviously in the same position as that of a same-sex couple who wish to 
formalise their relationship but reject marriage as an effective option. The Court of Appeal in 
Steinfeld did not hesitate to find comparability under Article 14.119 Interestingly, the Austrian 
Constitutional Court has since Ratzenböck provided – in effect – a model for the Supreme 
Court to consider: it has handed down a historic ruling creating complete symmetry of access 
to formal relationship statuses in Austria on the basis that the ban on same-sex marriage is 
discriminatory and registered partnerships should be opened to different-sex couples.120 The 
decision will take effect in late 2018.121  
 
The justification accepted by the majority in the Court of Appeal under Article 14 could well 
be rejected in the Supreme Court. As discussed, a measure creating differentiation between 
persons on grounds of sexual orientation can be justified if the measure taken is proportionate 
to the aim pursued. The government’s argument, as indicated, and accepted by the majority in 
the Court of Appeal, was that the aim was to take time to consider the impact of the 
introduction of same-sex marriage on civil partnerships; it also argued that it needed time to 
consider ways of equalising state recognition of the relationships of same-sex and different-
sex couples, and preferred to save the time that might be wasted if civil partnerships were 
                                                 
119 See Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237 at 
[167]-[169] (Briggs LJ). 
120  See the Austrian Constitutional Court judgment: G 258/2017, 4 December 2017 with press release in 
English:   https://www.vfgh.gv.at/medien/Ehe_fuer_gleichgeschlechtliche_Paare.en.php.  
121 These changes will occur on 31 December 2018 unless the legislature decides merely to repeal the Registered 
Partnership Act on the introduction of same-sex marriage.  
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made available to different-sex couples but then abolished. No timetable for the taking of the 
decision as to the future of civil partnerships was published. Assuming that that aim was 
accepted as legitimate, the measure taken to further it was to maintain the status quo – to 
avoid extending civil partnerships to different-sex couples for an unspecified period of time.  
 
Following Arden LJ’s argument, the measure taken to further that aim would require strict 
scrutiny, and under such scrutiny would have to be found to be weighty, given that it created 
differentiation on grounds of sexual orientation. In Vallianatos the demand for weighty 
reasons was found to mean that proportionality demands under Article 14 would not be 
satisfied if the measure chosen was merely suitable in principle to achieve the aim in question 
(in that instance protecting heterosexual unions outside marriage):122 it also had to be shown 
to be necessary to achieve that aim to exclude same-sex couples from the category of 
registered partnerships. It was further found in Taddeucci and McCall v Italy123 that that was 
particularly the case ‘where rights falling within the scope of Article 8 are concerned’.  
 
It is possible that, after the Supreme Court decision, a fairly substantial period of time may 
pass (in addition to the five years since 2013 when the differentiation arose) during which 
same-sex couples can access marriage or a civil partnership, but different-sex couples cannot 
access civil partnerships. During that period different-sex couples seeking relationship 
formalisation, but with beliefs precluding them from accessing marriage, would remain 
cohabitants, thereby experiencing detriment in terms of accessing certain benefits. That 
would mean that asymmetry of access had been maintained for a significant, indeterminate 
period of time, with legal consequences. Taking those points into account, was the measure 
chosen – to exclude different-sex couples from civil partnerships for an indefinite period of 
time – necessary to achieve the aims in question? The measure taken could possibly be found 
to be suitable for achieving the ‘wait and see’ aims but could not be said to be ‘necessary’ to 
achieve them. Its necessity could be found to be established in respect of avoidance of the 
introduction of different-sex civil partnerships only to abolish them later, but the necessity of 
concomitantly demanding an indeterminate amount of time before making a decision as to 
abolition is not apparent, as Arden LJ pointed out.124  
                                                 
122 Vallianatos v Greece (2014) 59 EHRR 12, at [85].  
123 Application no. 51362/09, judgment of 30 June 2016, at [89]. 
124 Steinfeld & Keidan v Secretary of State for Education [2017] EWCA Civ 81, [2017] 3 WLR 1237, at [111]-
[114]. It may be noted that Italy’s somewhat similar ‘wait and see’ argument (‘time was necessarily required to 
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Further, the suitability of the measure taken could be doubted since, as discussed below, a 
decision to abolish civil partnerships could be susceptible to a challenge under Article 8 read 
alone or with Article 14 ECHR under the HRA, brought by existing civil partners. Moreover, 
a possible underlying basis for the indeterminate length of time the government asserted that 
it needed to consider the future of civil partnerships, and the need therefore to take the 
measure of maintaining asymmetry of access for that period, may have been the desire to 
encourage different-sex couples to access the more established (and until Walker, in one 
respect, more privileged) relationship status – marriage – while leaving the less established 
status – civil partnership - to be populated by the proportion of same-sex couples for whom 
marriage is not an effective option.  In principle, the aim put forward by a government under 
Article 14, or the measures taken to realise it, should not themselves be tainted by covert 
discrimination against a protected group – in this instance same-sex couples. 
 
It is argued therefore that weighty reasons were not available to justify the differentiation 
under Article 14, so the difference of treatment could be found to be discriminatory. On that 
basis, in a move which would outpace Strasbourg on this matter,125 a breach of Article 8 read 
with 14 could be found in the Supreme Court. If so, the Court might consider deploying 
section 3 HRA to seek to reinterpret the relevant provisions of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 
to enable it to cover different-sex couples. In textual terms the change would be fairly 
minimal since the Act does not prefix ‘civil partner’ with the words ‘same-sex’: it would 
merely involve disapplying the words ‘of the same sex’ in sections 1(1) and 3(1)(a) of the 
Act, as the Loughton Bill was originally intended to do.126 To do so could be viewed as 
opposing the main purpose of the statute which was to provide protection specifically for 
same-sex couples. But while that was the intention in 2004, the context within which the 
Supreme Court will decide Steinfeld has significantly changed since then, partly due to the 
introduction of same-sex marriage. An analogy could be drawn with the decision in Ghaidan 
                                                                                                                                                        
achieve a gradual maturation of a common view’) was not accepted in the context of finding a breach of Article 
8 in Oliari and others v Italy (2015) 65 EHRR 957 at [176].  
125 See the comments of Lord Wilson on the matter of such outpacing in the minority in the Supreme Court in 
Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67, [2015] AC 901 at [105]-[106]. 
126 See the Civil Partnerships, Marriages and Deaths (Registration Etc.) Bill 2017-19 prior to Government 
amendments imposed at the Second Reading stage. Also note that on 13 July 2017 Baroness Burt introduced 
into the House of Lords the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Amendment) (Mixed Sex Couples) Bill 2017-2019 
adopting the same minor textual amendment approach but going further by amending sections 86 and 138 
relating to eligibility in Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively.  
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v Godin-Mendoza127 to the effect that section 3 HRA could be deployed to read the Rent Act 
1977 to cover same-sex couples.128 Obviously that was not the intention in 1977, but could be 
said in 2004, when Ghaidan was decided, not to oppose the grain of the statute in the 
changed social context at that time. However, the Supreme Court might well be reluctant on 
policy grounds to reshape sections 1 and 3 of the Civil Partnership Act to include different-
sex couples. The Loughton Bill in its original iteration was opposed by the government on a 
range of policy grounds: it would, it was argued, have necessitated changes to other statutes 
and given rise to private international law problems.129 Such issues would obviously also 
arise if the Supreme Court made the change in question.  
 
Instead the Court would probably be prepared to make a declaration of the incompatibility 
between Articles 8 and 14 and sections 1 and 3(1)(a) Civil Partnership Act 2004, although a 
finding of incompatibility does not make a declaration inevitable.130 A partial analogy could 
be drawn with Bellinger v Bellinger in which the government had already announced its 
intention to introduce comprehensive primary legislation relating to the implications of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 section 11(c) when the declaration as to its incompatibility 
with Article 8 was made in the House of Lords.131 Such a declaration in Steinfeld in the 
Supreme Court would be likely to have an influence on the review of the 2004 Act that the 
government has stated is currently under way, and which may now be more far-reaching if 
the Loughton Bill passes into law.132 Amendment to the 2004 Act, opening civil partnerships 
to different-sex couples, would provide one possible answer to the declaration. One possible 
result could be, therefore, that the reforms to access to formal relationship statuses discussed 
in Part 1, premised on creating equality between same and different-sex couples, could be 
brought to fulfilment: the Supreme Court could prompt full achievement of non-
                                                 
127 [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557. 
128 Here the House of Lords used s 3 HRA to construe ‘as his or her wife or husband’ in Sch 1, para 2 of the 
Rent Act 1977 to mean ‘as if they were his or her wife or husband’, enabling same-sex couples access to the 
same right to succeed a tenancy upon the death of a partner as enjoyed by different-sex couples.   
129 See the policy objections raised by government representative Robert Halfon MP during the Second Reading 
of Tim Loughton’s Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Amendment) Bill 2016-17 focusing on ‘the legislative 
complexity introduced by a change to the law alongside the difficulty in estimating the size of the challenge in 
successfully making such a change’: Hansard, HC Deb, vol 619, col 650 (13 January 2017).  
130 See R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657. 
131 [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 AC 467 at [37], [55]. 
132 Note that the Government has stated in the Second Reading of the Loughton Bill that work on the review of 
civil partnerships will be ‘commenced immediately’; that was regardless of whether the House permitted the 
Bill to have its Second Reading: Hansard, HC Deb, vol 635, col 1121 (2 February 2018). Of course, placing that 
commitment on a statutory footing, as the Loughton Bill intends, adds greater transparency to the review 
process and strengthens the obligation to reach a conclusion on this matter.  
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discrimination in terms of access to such statuses. But abolition of civil partnerships would 
also provide a response to a declaration of the incompatibility. 
 
3. THE DETRIMENTAL IMPACTS ON SAME-SEX COUPLES OF ABOLITION OF 
CIVIL PARTNERSHIPS 
 
A number of contracting states abolished registered partnerships when same-sex marriage 
was introduced, but England, Wales and Scotland are in the unique position of maintaining 
them for a significant period of time after the introduction of same-sex marriage, thereby 
giving rise to the expectation, especially after 2013, that entering one means entering a stable, 
established, enduring relationship status. It is notable that when it is known or anticipated that 
same-sex marriage is soon to be introduced, and may be accompanied by the abolition of civil 
(registered) partnerships in a state,133 there is often a significant drop in the take-up of such 
partnerships. That appears to be attributable in part to the reluctance of couples to enter a 
formal relationship status that may soon be abolished,134 precisely because couples do not 
want to find themselves in a ‘legacy’ relationship. That occurred very strikingly in England 
and Wales prior to the passing of the 2013 Act since couples would not necessarily have been 
aware that civil partnerships were not to be abolished.135 But when it became apparent that 
abolition was not intended, take-up of civil partnerships stabilised and then rose slightly.136  
 
There are a range of possible models, as discussed further below, for addressing the future of 
civil partnerships other than opening them up universally to all couples.137 These models 
range from, firstly, leaving such partnerships open only to same-sex couples, to, secondly, 
closing them to new entrants but maintaining the existing partnerships, and, thirdly, to 
abolishing them and ending the system entirely. Obviously the first option is the one that will 
                                                 
133 On this decrease in registrations prior to the introduction of same-sex marriage, see B Tobin, ‘Registered 
Partnerships in the Republic of Ireland’ in JM Scherpe and A Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships – 
Family Recognition beyond Marriage? (Intersentia, 2017) 285. 
134 See B Sloan, ‘Registered Partnerships in Northern Ireland’ in JM Scherpe and A Hayward, ibid, 262, 
questioning whether the decrease in registrations in 2015 ‘can be explained by anticipation of the introduction of 
same-sex marriage’ which is yet to be introduced in Northern Ireland. 
135 See A Hayward, ‘Registered Partnerships in England and Wales’ in JM Scherpe and A Hayward, ibid, 201, 
noting that there were 5,646 registrations in 2013 and 1683 in 2014, the year that same-sex marriage was 
introduced. 
136 See Office for National Statistics, ‘Civil Partnerships in England and Wales: 2016’, 26 September 2017. 
137 These models are analysed in A Hayward, ‘The Future of Civil Partnership in England and Wales’ in JM 
Scherpe and A Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships – Family Recognition beyond Marriage? 
(Intersentia, 2017).  
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be addressed by the Supreme Court, as discussed, on the basis that it creates formal status 
discrimination.  
 
(a) Same-sex couples ideologically opposed to marriage 
 
The second option of abolishing civil partnerships completely for new entrants was 
mentioned in Steinfeld and, after an inconclusive consultation in 2014, is currently under 
review; the government considers that sufficient data on which to base a decision will be 
available by September 2019.138 If introduced it would mean that same and different-sex 
couples would each have access to one formalised relationship status only - marriage. Thus, 
as between same and different-sex couples, the asymmetry of access found by Arden LJ to 
create a breach of Article 14 read with 8 would disappear. However, retaining civil 
partnerships and opening them to all couples instead would benefit same-sex couples: all the 
points made above as to the detrimental impact on different-sex couples ideologically 
opposed to marriage of the lack of ability to access the civil partnership status would also 
apply due to abolition to same-sex couples who are also so opposed,139  and it is argued that 
the detrimental impact could be greater. The position would be that some same and different-
sex couples would continue to seek state formalisation and recognition of their relationship 
with the civic benefits thereby accruing, but a number of them would reject the marriage 
status as non-reflective of their relationship due to its lingering patriarchal associations.140 
But some same-sex couples might also view it more strongly than would some heterosexual 
couples as an institution reflective of heteronormativity and heterosexual mores.141  So if 
abolition occurred some same-sex couples would be denied state formalisation of their 
relationship on the basis of a more deeply rooted ideological objection to marriage. While 
this argument might find recognition under Article 8 in relation to existing civil partners, as 
discussed below, it could, under non-legalistic dignity-based arguments aid in persuading the 
                                                 
138 See Part 1 above on the current status of the Loughton Bill.  
139 See C Stychin, ‘Not (Quite) a Horse and Carriage: The Civil Partnership Act 2004’ (2006) 14 Fem LS 79 and 
L Lea, ‘“I don’t”: Why Choose Civil Partnership Over Marriage?’ BBC News 2 November 2016. 
140 It is not argued that all same or different-sex couples who reject marriage but seek to enter a formalised 
relationship status are attracted to civil partnerships due to the patriarchal or heteronormative associations of 
marriage: see A Barlow and J Smithson, ‘Legal assumptions, cohabitants’ talk and the rocky road to reform’ 
[2010] CFLQ 328. See also A Jowett and E Peel, ‘“A Question of Equality and Choice”: Same-Sex Couples’ 
Attitudes towards Civil Partnership after the Introduction of Same-Sex Marriage’ (2017) 8 Psychology and 
Sexuality 69. 
141 See K McK Norrie, ‘Marriage is for Heterosexuals – May the Rest of Us be Saved from It’ [2000] CFLQ 
363.  
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government to choose the option of opening civil partnerships to different-sex couples rather 
than abolishing them.  
 
The evidence is that a significant proportion of same-sex civil partners do not seek to marry 
since they have not taken the option, available to them since 2013, of conversion of their civil 
partnership to marriage. 142  Further, whilst there was a decrease in civil partnership 
registrations immediately preceding and following the introduction of same-sex marriage,143 
2016 saw the first annual increase since the introduction of same-sex marriage (3.4 per cent 
compared with 2015).144 This pattern is especially true of older same-sex couples145 which is 
perhaps attributable to the fact that their longer experience of legalised homophobia has 
created from their perspective an association between marriage and contempt for same-sex 
relations they find harder to overcome than do younger same-sex couples.  
 
It has also been pointed out by the Church of England in response to the Consultation that 
some Christian and other same-sex couples hold the traditional understanding of marriage as 
being between a man and a woman, and therefore will not contract marriage; so retention of 
civil partnerships would still provide such couples with a social and legal framework within 
which their relationship ‘can be honoured and recognised’.146  
 
(b) Existing civil partnerships 
Abolition for new entrants (the second option) would have an adverse impact on same-sex 
couples already in a civil partnership since their relationship status would then appear to have 
a diminished validity. Assuming that a number of couples maintained their civil partnerships, 
they would become part of a steadily diminishing and, it is argued, ghettoised, group in a 
                                                 
142 See J Haskey, ‘Civil Partnerships and same-sex marriages in England and Wales: A Social and Demographic 
Perspective’ (2016) Fam Law 44, noting that only 1 in 8 civil partnerships have been converted to marriages and 
the observation of Tim Loughton MP in the Second Reading of his Bill, discussed above, that ‘more than 80% 
of same-sex couples who have committed to a civil partnership do not think that they need to or want to convert 
that into a marriage’: Hansard, HC Deb, vol 635, col 1142  (2 February 2018). 
143 See Office of National Statistics, Marriages in England and Wales in 2015: Statistical Bulletin, 28 February 
2018.   
144 See Office of National Statistics, Civil Partnerships in England and Wales in 2016: Statistical Bulletin, 26 
September 2017.  
145 Nearly half (49%) of all individuals forming civil partnerships in 2016 were aged 50 and over. See a similar 
observation made in Steinfeld by Arden LJ at [121] who noted that ‘numbers for this group are clearly not 
insignificant’. 
146 See Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): Report on 
Conclusions (London, 2014) para 2.5. 
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‘legacy’ relationship. 147  In the Second Reading of his Bill in 2018, Tim Loughton MP 
considered that the move would create ‘tens of thousands of civil partners in limbo, forced 
either to become an abolished species or to convert to the full marriage that they had thus far 
resisted’.148 Echoing the theme of equality present within this area of law, Sandy Martin MP 
argued that such a move would create a ‘separate but different’ relationship that 
fundamentally undermined the ‘basic principle that people should be treated the same in 
law’.149 All legislation passed in future affecting married couples would, until the last civil 
partners died, have to make special provision for that group. Some civil partners would, for 
those reasons, decide to convert to marriage, but there would be an element of state coercion 
to do so involved if they would not have chosen conversion otherwise – and, as mentioned 
above, it appears that a number of them would not have done so.150 Whilst the mere presence 
of civil partnerships has been seen as undermining the institution of marriage, it is also 
arguable that restricting choice and in effect coercing couples into marriage in order to access 
legal protections can equally be viewed as undermining that institution.  
 
The further possibility of forced conversion to marriage, or forced dissolution, if civil 
partnerships are abolished (the third option) has been floated by the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport in the consultation mentioned above.151 Responding to the consultation, the 
Church in Wales found: ‘it would be particularly unkind to do away with civil partnership 
retrospectively, forcing those who have already contracted them to either dissolve them or 
convert them into marriage.’ The TUC commented: ‘...abolition would make it compulsory 
either for existing Civil Partners to get married or to separate and this would be a brutal 
enforced change of their preferred status…’.152 That possibility has led to consideration of 
creating some form of statutory dissolution in order to reflect the fact that the state is 
inflicting the change on civil partners who do not seek to marry, so those couples should be 
accorded an alternative way of ending their relationship, as opposed to dissolution in the 
                                                 
147 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): A Consultation, 
London, 2014, para 3.10, noting ‘[u]p to 50,000 UK couples could be left in a legacy relationship which would 
increasingly become a legal relic and which the State would have to continue to administer’. 
148 Hansard, HC Deb, vol 635, col 1104 (2 February 2018). Similar observations were made by Andy Slaughter 
MP who stated that abolition would be ‘perverse’ and would create ‘a historical and fossilised group of people’. 
Hansard, HC Deb, vol 635, col 1132 (2 February 2018).   
149 Ibid, col 1126. 
150 Couples were incentivised in 2014 to convert their civil partnerships through a waiver of the associated 
administrative fees in the first year of same-sex marriage coming into force. 
151  See Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): A 
Consultation, (London, 2014) paras 3.2-3.8.  
152  Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): Report on 
Conclusions (London, 2014) para 2.8. 
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usual sense, since it is linked to the breakdown of relationships.153 Ultimately, the prospect of 
abolishing civil partnerships for same-sex couples is likely to be met with considerable 
resistance; activist Peter Tatchell has stated that it would ‘provoke an almighty backlash’ and 
‘do catastrophic damage to relations between the Conservative party and LGBT people’.154 
 
(c) Challenging a decision to abolish civil partnerships under the HRA 
 
A challenge could be brought, for example, by an LGBT activist group partly made up of and 
representing current civil partners. It is possible that the second and third options are 
inconsistent with the demands of Article 8, or of that Article read with Article 14, under the 
HRA, but they may be consistent with those demands within the scope of this area of 
jurisprudence as currently understood at Strasbourg since all that appears to be required at 
present is that a legal framework is available to accord a couple’s relationship formal 
recognition. 155  It is argued, however, that a challenge under Article 8 read with 14 to 
abolition as direct discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation would probably fail since 
it would be hard to identify comparators given that all couples would have available to them 
one formalised relationship status – marriage, thus demonstrating the limitations of relying on 
the equality argument alone. 
 
Adopting the third option would mean that existing civil partners would experience detriment 
linked to sexual orientation since, if they had already determined that marriage was a non-
effective option for them, they would be forced to relinquish a previously recognised 
relationship form available only to same-sex couples;156 no effective formalisation of their 
relationships would be available. Adoption of the second option would mean that, as 
mentioned above, civil partners would tend to view themselves as inhabiting a relationship 
status with diminished credibility. Indirect discrimination is recognised under Article 14,157 
and, following the Court of Appeal decision in Steinfeld, Article 8 would clearly be engaged. 
                                                 
153 Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): A Consultation, 
(London, 2014) para 3.5.  
154  Equal Civil Partnerships Campaign, ‘Campaign responds to reports of Government u-turn on civil 
partnerships for opposite-sex couples’, 1 February 2018.   
155 See Orlandi and others v Italy no. 40183/07, judgment of 9 June 2016, at [210]. 
156 On the problems generated by this approach see Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership 
Review (England and Wales): Report on Conclusions (London, 2014) para 2.8, para 2.29.  
157 See: DH v Czech Republic (2006) 43 EHRR 923; Horvath and Kiss v Hungary No. 11146/11, judgment of 6 
February 2013.  
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Abolition of civil partnerships as an apparently neutral measure would in practice have some 
adverse impact on those in existing partnerships, who by definition would be same-sex 
couples. (Formally speaking, according to the Civil Partnership Act 2004, civil partnerships 
are available to any couple of the same sex, so they are based on gender, not sexuality, but de 
facto abolition of civil partnerships would have an adverse impact on homosexuals rather 
than heterosexuals.) No similar case has arisen at Strasbourg: it would have to be 
demonstrated that the couples in existing civil partnerships had suffered adverse impact to 
support an indirect discrimination claim. That would be fairly straightforward under the third 
option,158 but more difficult under the second, since no civic benefits would be lost; the 
detriment would flow only from the perception that the validity of the relationship status had 
been undermined.  
 
In relation to either option arguments could also be put forward under Article 8 read alone.  
In that case, a court would have to begin by finding that the situation fell within the ambit of 
Article 8, relying on the values of dignity and autonomy.159 The situation could be found to 
fall within its ambit on the basis that the state had breached a negative obligation – to avoid 
interference with an existing relationship status. If it was considered (as found in M and 
acknowledged in Steinfeld) that detriment should therefore be shown, that requirement would 
appear to be readily satisfied in relation to the third option for the reasons already discussed, 
given the serious interference with private and family life that a forced relinquishing of a civil 
partnership, or its dissolution, would represent. That course would create a far greater 
disturbance of family life, showing a greater disrespect for the family life of existing civil 
partners than would opening civil partnerships instead to different-sex couples. Under Article 
8(2) the interference could be found to be unjustified on the basis of fair balance since no 
strong countervailing public interest can be identified;160 further, adopting the second option 
would have created a more minimal invasion of the right; therefore the demands of 
proportionality would not be likely to be found to be satisfied. A court would be free under s 
2 HRA to find a breach of Article 8 since no clear, contrary decision at Strasbourg covers this 
                                                 
158 See Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership Review (England and Wales): Report on 
Conclusions (London, 2014) para 2.29.  
159 See D Feldman, ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (2000) PL 61, 74 (in a different context): ‘when one 
allies the interest in dignity with that in autonomy on classic, liberal principles, the right of people to make 
choices about their lifestyles (including their sexual activities), and to identify their notions of the good life for 
themselves, is of central importance’. 
160 See Oliari and others v Italy (2015) 65 EHRR 957 at [160]. 
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point: 161  Strasbourg has not had to consider the question of maintenance of registered 
partnerships followed by later forced conversion to marriage or forced dissolution once same-
sex marriage was introduced in a state.162 So if the third option was taken, which may be 
unlikely, a breach of Article 8 might well be found.163 (If civil partnerships were extended to 
different-sex couples, but then abolition was contemplated, the simple option of maintaining 
instead the partnership status for same and different-sex couples, as in the Netherlands, would 
also create a more minimal invasion.)  
 
But in relation to the second option a domestic court would probably be less likely to find a 
breach. The margin of appreciation doctrine is inapplicable in domestic courts, as pointed out 
in Steinfeld, but the legislation enabling abolition might be found to fall within the 
discretionary area of judgment accorded to Parliament/the executive, a notion that is fairly 
well established in post-HRA judicial reasoning. 164  It may be said that domestic 
jurisprudence has evolved post-Nicklinson165 in that arguably some encouragement has been 
given to the judiciary to respecting that area when applying the ECHR in respect of 
particularly contentious matters that would fall within the margin of appreciation that the 
state would be allowed at Strasbourg. The notion of a discretionary area of judgment has been 
utilised in the domestic courts in recent years to avoid finding a violation of the ECHR where 
the view is taken that the issue should be dealt with by Parliament, especially in areas of 
contentious social policy.166  
 
It might appear that the future of civil partnerships is precisely the type of issue which would 
invite the use of this area of discretionary judgment to preserve the right of Parliament to 
                                                 
161 In the transsexual case of Hämäläinen v Finland (2014) ECHR 787 coerced conversion of a marriage to a 
registered partnership (after the transition of one member of the married couple had meant that the marriage 
became same-sex) was not found to create a breach of Articles 8 or 12, but that was on the basis that states were 
not under an obligation to introduce same-sex marriage. 
162 On reform patterns, see JM Scherpe, ‘The Past, Present and Future of Registered Partnerships’ in JM Scherpe 
and A Hayward, The Future of Registered Partnerships – Family Recognition beyond Marriage? (Intersentia, 
2017) 561, 576. 
163 Stonewall acknowledged that the Government could face costs due to legal challenges by individuals who 
had their civil partnerships converted to marriage: Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Civil Partnership 
Review (England and Wales): Report on Conclusions (London, 2014) para 2.29. 
164 See D Pannick, ‘Principles of interpretation of Convention rights under the Human Rights Act and the 
discretionary area of judgement’ (1998) PL 545, 549-551 and J Jowell and Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: a tangled 
story’ (2005) PL 346.  
165 See R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) v Ministry of Justice [2014] UKSC 38, [2015] AC 657, 
in particular at [73] and [296]. 
166 See eg the doctrine’s use in relation to Northern Irish abortion law in A-G for Northern Ireland v NIHRC 
[2017] NICA 42. 
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choose the path it views as most appropriate, especially as Strasbourg has accepted that 
where one formalised relationship status is available to a couple, the state will be within its 
margin of appreciation in determining that it need not make a different status available.167 
While acceptance of that area was not expressly referenced by the Court of Appeal in 
Steinfeld, it could be said to accord with the general thrust of the judgment since there was a 
willingness of all three judges, including Arden LJ, to allow Parliament to take any one of the 
available options as to the future of civil partnerships; the problem for Arden LJ simply lay in 
the indeterminate delay involved in the ‘wait and see’ policy. Those points were made in the 
context of Article 14, but where discriminatory treatment was not involved significance 
would be more likely to be placed on according a discretionary area of judgment to the 
legislature, albeit, it is argued, not one covering the more serious invasion of family life 
represented by the third option.  
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
Clearly, furtherance of equality between same and different-sex couples relates to the 
expression of a fundamental human rights value.168 This article has traced movement towards 
the creation of equality due to the introduction of same-sex civil partnerships and 
marriage. The search for the ‘perfection’ of equality as linked to access to formal relationship 
statuses was furthered by the Supreme Court in Walker but only contemplated by the majority 
in the Court of Appeal in Steinfeld. So this article has made a case – which the Supreme 
Court may accept - for broadening the conception of non-discrimination in relation to respect 
for family life by encompassing a greater value to be placed on creating symmetry of access 
to recognised formal expressions of relationships under Article 14 than was recognised by the 
majority in Steinfeld.  Once weight is ascribed to according such symmetry, the imprecisely 
formulated justification accepted in Steinfeld for withholding it for a significant period comes 
under a pressure which, it has been argued, it is unable to withstand.  
 
This article concludes by reaffirming that ‘perfecting’ equality in the sense argued for here 
means creating symmetry of access to formalisation of relationships as between same and 
                                                 
167 Schalk and Kopf v Austria (2011) 53 EHRR 20 at [101]. See also Orlandi and others v Italy no. 40183/07, 
judgment of 9 June 2016. 
168 See N Bamforth, ‘Same-Sex Partnerships and Arguments of Justice’ in R Wintemute and M Andenaes, Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Study of National, European and International Law (Hart Publishing, 
2001). 
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different-sex couples by opening civil partnerships to different-sex couples in England and 
Wales. But it also concludes that the limitations of the direct discrimination argument under 
Article 14 are revealed by the threat of abolition of the civil partnership status since same and 
different-sex couples would be placed in the same position, although some same-sex couples 
would be more detrimentally affected in terms of a state assault on their access to a 
relationship status of particular meaning to them. As discussed, the detriment suffered by 
existing civil partners due to abolition could be addressed by deploying arguments under 
Article 8 linking dignity and equal treatment. The limitations of relying on the equality 
rationale alone to drive the introduction of civil partnerships, and same-sex marriage require 
acknowledgement, since achieving equality of access to formal relationship statuses could be 
achieved at the expense of disregarding the value of civil partnerships. That point should not 
be disregarded by the government response if the key principle established by the Supreme 
Court in Steinfeld in terms of ‘perfecting’ equality is that disallowing access to a particular 
formal relationship status on the basis of sexual orientation amounts to discrimination under 
Article 14.  
 
 
